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Nick Couldry (Introduction): 
 
Changing forms of information production and circulation must have some implications for the division of 
labor. Some see new spaces of positive social and political potential, whereas others see new forms of 
labor exploitation. Can we formulate any common ground that would advance the debate?  
 
Is unrewarded labor ever good? Are we in the middle of a genuine rethinking of what constitutes labor (as 
opposed to free creative activity)? How do questions of labor connect with changing regimes of 
temporality? Do we have a basic need for free time and unconstrained activity, and, if we do, how is this 
consistent with digital developments? Should we care if our activities generate profitable data for others, 
and, if so, why? 
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Mark Andrejevic: 
 
I imagine that there is a fair amount of overlap between those who see new spaces of creative production 
with positive social and political potential and those who also see new forms of labor exploitation in the 
changing forms of information production and circulation Nick references. Theorists of these changes may 
frame the relationship between the up- and downsides differently, and they may choose to focus more 
pointedly on one or the other aspect, but I imagine each would concede that both aspects potentially exist 
simultaneously. I wouldn’t want to make this into a two-sides-to-every-story ledger-balancing exercise, 
but I do want to point out that the critical position conserves the possibility of imagining how things might 
be otherwise—and this “otherwise” tends to gesture in the direction of the potential benefits of the 
technologies, perhaps even conceding some actual ones. By the same token, the celebration of the 
positive social and political potential concedes the need for change in a progressive direction. 
 
Having said that, however, I suspect it might be harder to arrive at a clear, common ground sense of what 
exactly some of the core issues are. I’ve been following discussions around the notion of exploitation in 
the digital era for a while now and would be fascinated to see whether it’s possible to arrive at a shared 
understanding of what we might mean by that term—or, failing that, to at least arrive at a shared sense of 
what the key questions are that would need to be answered to determine whether exploitation is taking 
place. We could probably relatively easily agree on the fact that exploitation is taking place in the clothing 
sweatshops of Bangladesh or in Foxconn’s factories or in the orange groves of Florida—these are examples 
that fit with the forms of labor in response to which the prevalent, Marxist-inflected version of exploitation 
took shape. Addressing the depredations of human immiseration would certainly entail prioritizing a focus 
on these and related forms of brutal and dehumanizing exploitation. Such forms of exploitation give rise to 
familiar definitions of exploitation such as those outlined by Nancy Holmstrom (1997) (“surplus, unpaid 
and forced labor, the product of which the producers do not control”) or Erik Olin Wright: (as paraphrased 
by David Hesmondhalgh (2010, p. 274):  
Exploitation occurs when the material welfare of one class is causally dependent upon 
the material deprivation of another. . . . Second, that causal dependence depends in 
turn on the exclusion of workers from key productive resources, especially property. 
Third, the mechanism through which both these features (causal dependence and 
exclusion) operate is appropriation of the labour of the exploited. 
But what about the forms of value-generating activity that, in the online economy, have been described 
as exploitative (by, for example, Tiziana Terranova, 2000), but don’t exactly fit the industrial-era model? 
There is a sense of concern about the terms of ownership and control that allow Facebook, for example, to 
harness the power of what one industry executive described in The Wall Street Journal as “the largest 
unpaid workforce in history” (Laney, 2012, para. 2).  
In a not unrelated formulation, tech guru Jaron Lanier (2013) has described the online data economy in 
terms of the emergence of “a new tiny class of people who always benefit. Those who keep the new 
ledgers, the giant computing services that model you, spy on you, and predict your actions, turn your life 
activities into the greatest fortunes in history” (p. 1). The terms mobilized here reek of exploitation: a 
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small owner class benefits from the unpaid labor of the masses. But what about the coercion and the 
immiseration? Just how concerned might we be about exploitation (of users) that doesn’t seem to result 
directly in the aggravation of human misery? Christian Fuchs (2010), among others, has pushed in the 
direction of considering the ways in which coercion is embedded in the social relations and processes that 
make social networking and other networked tools of information access and information sharing crucial 
to a certain type of (increasingly precarious) worker, and we might have to expand our notion of 
immiseration to include the ways in which our own data are being turned back upon us for purposes 
ranging from law enforcement to health care. But do we then run the danger of trivializing more brutal 
and widely recognized forms of exploitation? This needn’t be the case, I think—indeed, in tracing a 
common thread between very different forms of exploitation, perhaps we are also unearthing the potential 
basis for a recognition of solidarity. Holmstrom emphasizes the central role played by “alienation” in 
Marx’s account of exploitation, and this remains, for me, a crucial insight into the insidious character of all 
kinds of exploitation: They transform our own activity (or at least an important part of it) back upon 
ourselves in unrecognizable form, serving interests and imperatives that are not our own. 
 
Nick Couldry: 
I am glad that Mark raised the question: What actually is our definition of exploitation? So how might we 
move toward defining that crucial term in a way that recognizes the specificities, and also limits, of digital 
contexts? 
 
There clearly are cases—indeed, widespread cases—of immiseration within forms of digital labor. And 
Virginia Eubanks, in her book Digital Dead End (2011), points out that many poor digital workers have 
gone unrecognized in some high-profile debates, being more likely to be at the receiving end of well-
meaning but mistargeted digital divide initiatives that are aimed at poverty but forget that many poor 
workers use ICT intensively in their poorly paid work. 
 
But forms of inequality linked to the distribution of digital resources are not felt as exploitative, though 
they create asymmetries that are preconditions for future exploitation or abuse. My starting point here is 
to return to the concept of symbolic power and foreground the extreme asymmetries of symbolic power 
that characterize (in some respects, inevitably) the installation and operation of our everyday digital 
platforms. Legal scholar Julie Cohen (2012) puts it well when she writes about “a system of [digital] 
governance that is authoritarian in the generic sense: one that favors compliant submission to authority” 
(pp. 188–189). An authoritarian structure need not, per se, be exploitative, but it provides one starting 
point for specific forms of exploitation. 
 
John Banks: 
 
I think Mark has identified the issues here really well. What, indeed, is exploitation, and what practices 
might be characterized as exploitative in these digital contexts? As Mark notes, the clear cases of 
immiseration we can generally agree on. But what about the practices that aren’t necessarily 
characterized by immiseration but are still shaped by asymmetric power relations in which value is 
captured by those with the power? Nick observes that in some of these cases the practices might not be 
1092 M. Andrejevic, J. Banks, J. E. Campbell, N. Couldry, A. Fish, A. Hearn & L. Ouellette IJoC 8 (2014) 
 
felt as exploitative. This is important. What are the conditions and contexts in which these practices (say, 
around the uses made of the data generated by participants) are felt to be exploitative or coercive by the 
participants? Are the same practices identified as exploitative by some participants but not by others? 
What are the differences at work here? 
These are questions I’ve been very interested in with my video-games industry research. Through 
ethnographic research I’ve tried to identify when participants (both professional developers and gamers) 
start using the language of exploitation to characterize or to understand certain practices. It interests me 
that sometimes apparently the same practice, under certain conditions and at something of a threshold, 
can start to be viewed as unfair, unreasonable, and even exploitative and coercive. So the ethnographic 
approach here is to identify in what ways users and participants start identifying and characterizing 
various practices as exploitative and the various meanings that they attach to the practices. 
 
In all this, the thorny problem of self-exploitation emerges. This is close to what Andrew Ross (2000) has 
described as “the mental labor problem.” People might not view some practices initially as exploitative, 
but might they still be exploitative? What kinds of knowledge and awareness results in them shifting their 
perspective and starting to identify a practice as exploitative? I’m interested in controversies that emerge 
among participants (for example, between platform owners and users) in which terms around these 
practices, such as fairness, equity, and so on, start to be interrogated. However, my sense is to be 
somewhat careful and indeed reluctant to label practices as self-exploitation. 
I’m interested in how shared senses or understandings of exploitation are emerging among the 
participants themselves around digital-era changes in conditions of cultural production and consumption. 
Mark’s point that alienation may be especially significant is important—but what are these experiences of 
alienation, and how are they perhaps changing? What are, borrowing from Nick, the specificities of that 
alienation in digital contexts? Here, I’m drawing from recent research with games developers on how big 
data and associated data analytics impact on their craft of designing games. Some of the comments 
they’ve made to me in interviews might be characterized as expressions of alienation. But would they then 
also view this as a form of exploitation? 
When do participants (following from Mark’s formulation) identify their own activities as serving interests 
and imperatives that are not their own? Indeed, even when they are aware of this, are participants also at 
times comfortable with this? How are they assessing the balance of interests and imperatives at work 
here, including their own? The various ways in which many of these practices are framed and constituted 
(in their very materiality—here I’m thinking of work by Tarleton Gillespie, 2010, and others on politics of 
platforms and algorithmic culture) may make it difficult for participants to assess the various interests and 
imperatives in play. 
So, in all this, our definition(s) of exploitation are important. But I’m also interested to ask what meanings 
and values are emerging among the participants themselves. 
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Adam Fish: 
 
In my opinion, it has been historical amnesia, a rigid theoretical fidelity, and methodological limitations 
that prohibit political economists and cultural studies scholars from finding a common language for the 
description of production practices in information economies. With a historically situated and 
ethnographically grounded approach complete with a degree of theoretical infidelity capable of 
appropriating both political economic and cultural studies approaches, the “exploitation” versus “virtuous” 
sharing approach to Internet-enabled productivity can be transcended. I think John Banks’ work (2013), 
which highlights the emic voices of those working in the video-game industry, shows that such polemics 
mean more to theorists than to working people. How to take our subjects seriously while building critical 
theory from their responses is our challenge. 
 
Part of the problem is the temporality of research scale. Markets and commons are in a historically co-
constituting relationship. Tim Wu (2011) calls this market/commons oscillating co-constitution the 
historical cycle from amateur-driven openness to professional closure that characterizes the trajectory of 
information infrastructures. Strangely, in my research with Internet and television producers, I’ve seen 
this historical cycle exist in their subjective labor histories. This meso-level historical approach recognizes 
how both creative and commoditizing agencies exist throughout a subject’s life course. I am not sure what 
to call this research emphasis on temporality and experience, but it articulates with the possibility of social 
mobility, and it can’t simply be categorized as either exploitation or virtuous work. 
How to define time-based change, cultural processes, and subjective experience in a word? Semifictional 
anecdotes must do: the bug-exploiting hacker who turns into a cybersecurity expert, the open source 
geek who becomes a proprietary software maven, the World of Warcraft server owner who becomes a 
cloud service provider. For every instance of this social mobility there are countless individual and system-
based failures. This boom-and-bust cycle is inherent to capitalist expansion and, with it, what Kuehn and 
Corrigan (2013) call the possibility and sadness of “hope labor.” The eventual result of this selective social 
mobility might result in unsavory types of employment, and the political economist might say that these 
subjects are interpellated, their community discourse merely ideological, that they have false 
consciousness, and are hailed by the capitalism world system. Perhaps. My point is that moments of 
exploitation and virtuous community formation are in a co-constituting dialectical tension throughout a 
meso-phase of labor time and throughout the digital worker’s life. We need a type of theoretical infidelity, 
appropriating theories from both political economy and cultural studies to make sense of this. 
 
I agree with Mark that political economists think the world can be better. So the question remains of how 
to create ruptures that aren’t just short-term entrepreneurial disruptions for the few but long-term 
political upheavals capable of making just and equitable labor possible for the many. How much 
improvement in terms of labor can the present information infrastructure actually bear? Is it possible to 
have information infrastructures, requiring billions of dollars in investment and running on advertising, and 
also have them democratize equal access to humane labor? Our colleagues researching free and open-
source software often think these systems are truly antihegemonic; they are, as Schoonmaker (2012) 
calls them, a “virus” capable of “infecting capitalism.” Following Streeter (2013) and also Morozov (2013), 
1094 M. Andrejevic, J. Banks, J. E. Campbell, N. Couldry, A. Fish, A. Hearn & L. Ouellette IJoC 8 (2014) 
 
I am not so sure there is a technological solution to the social problem of inequality. Can we support a 
system (capitalism) and its information infrastructures that result in inequality with a system that 
attempts to achieve equality (democracy)? How can we describe this system in such a way that is both 
true to the historical experiences of our research subjects and that can come to constitute theory? How we 
spend our labor and leisure, online and off-, is implicated in the answer. 
Alison Hearn: 
 
Of course, it goes without saying that I feel completely aligned with Mark’s plea to maintain a commitment 
to critique, to imagining the world otherwise, even when that places difficult demands on us as 
researchers. As Adam notes, current conditions require us to engage in a kind of theoretical (and 
methodological) infidelity and an ongoing kind of situational reflexivity about the possible limits of our own 
fields, training, and, indeed, allegiance to our positions as independent thinkers and researchers. 
 
Given the discussion so far, and inspired by a recent edition of ephemera: theory and politics in 
organization on the topic, it seems appropriate to revisit Paolo Virno’s notion of the “communism of 
capitalism” (in A Grammar of the Multitude, 2004). His claim is that post-Fordist capitalism appropriates 
communist ideas and practices and makes them the very ground for value production. Communist goals, 
such as the abolition of wage labor, the end of the centrality of the state as political decision maker, and 
the proliferation of different forms of individual self-valorization, undergo “an insidious and terrible 
interpretation” (Virno, 2004, p. 110 ) under contemporary capitalism, morphing into something thoroughly 
recognizable, and yet also deeply “uncanny” (Beverungen, Murtola, & Schwartz, 2013). Boltanski and 
Chiapello, in The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005), have also addressed these broad developments, as have 
many others who have embraced the rise of this kind of “virtual communism” (Benkler, 2006; Lessig, 
2004). But, to my mind, Virno pithily highlights a central and crucial contradiction; under these conditions 
we see “a communality of generalized intellect without material equality” (2004, p. 14). 
Of course, one obvious and foundational set of material inequities involves the privately owned and 
unaccountable infrastructures and baseline architectures that condition and orient our online expressions, 
participation, and sociality (i.e., our communications and our “commons”). Under these structuring 
conditions, the commons is reduced to a mere resource, and the task of political economy must involve 
tracing how this resource is conditioned, legally constrained or enabled, mined, packaged, and exchanged 
for value by the barons of the social media gold rush; in other words, we must try to access the new 
“hidden abode” of online value production, tracking its means and relations of production. It also requires 
mapping out emergent forms of worker subjectivity. Some of these include the social media influencer; 
the perpetually monitored, always-on, mobile worker; and the microworker or Mechanical Turker. As 
Adam suggests, we must be attentive to the ways these new forms of worker subjectivity are caught in a 
temporally based boom-and-bust cycle. As we witness the perpetual disaggregation and reaggregation of 
worker subjectivity, we see intensified contradictions; on the one hand, worker uniqueness and 
distinctiveness (i.e., self-branding) is summoned as necessary value added by potential employers, and, 
on the other, we are told that our singularity and specificity, as individuals and workers, matters little to 
data miners and analyzers, who are only looking for broad patterns of behavior. And so individuals are 
inserted into the global flows of capital in all their specificity and yet are simultaneously stripped of their 
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meaningful identities; they become resource, worker, and product but do not control the means of their 
representation, their circulation, or the profits that are derived. To borrow a term introduced by Nick Dyer-
Witheford (2001), we become indebted global value subjects. 
Actually pursuing the kind of institutional analysis and production study outlined above is very difficult, 
because, as John points out, so many of the processes involved (data-mining procedures, algorithms, etc.) 
are black-boxed, and, even when researchers do gain access, they are often required to sign 
nondisclosure agreements. As a result, the quality and communication of findings can be severely limited. 
Those of us in the academy who want to conduct research into the property regimes underpinning so 
much of our communication find ourselves confronting the issue of access to these logics at every turn. 
These limits are not simply a question of methodological hurdles to be overcome by better, or better 
connected, scholarship; as they raise larger political issues about access and control, they illuminate the 
limits of our own material conditions of production as independent scholars and force us to confront how, 
or where, we figure ourselves on the spectrum between activist scholarship and accommodationist 
capitulation. If we cannot access the terms of measurement and valorization that constitute the grounds 
and parameters of new forms of work, how are we meant to understand, contest, or think beyond them? 
Must we join the private research departments of Intel or Microsoft to procure the information necessary 
to form an empirically based critique? How, and on what terms, can we constitute independent criticism 
on the conflicted terrain of the communism of capitalism? 
Laurie Ouellette:  
Many important issues have been raised, but there is an absence in the conversation thus far. That 
absence is gender. 
 
The subject implied by much scholarship on digital labor is male. What happens when we acknowledge 
and foreground gender difference? This shift of emphasis could lead to a consideration of the mostly 
impoverished women sweatshop workers who manufacture our digital devices, as Vicki Mayer (2011) has 
done. 
 
Taking gender into account also complicates the agency/creativity versus free labor debate. On the one 
hand, the persistent sexual division of labor must be acknowledged by celebratory accounts of the digital 
environment. Who has the leisure time to co-create? Whose interactivity is configured around the 
gendered practices of self-improvement and family regulation? Is something lost when we value the 
political possibilities of intense engagement via new technologies over the pleasurable distractions (what 
Janice Radway, 1991, called “temporary escapes”) historically offered by women’s mass media? 
 
On the other hand, powerful critiques that rely mainly on a male subject must also be rethought. Current 
understandings of exploitation often overlook the role of unwaged women’s domestic and familial work in 
the production of surplus value. How might we address the rising imperative to create, interact, and 
coproduce digital content in light of the persistent sexual division of labor? To what extent is women’s 
digital production and interactivity configured around practices of self-improvement and family regulation? 
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How does this unwaged activity contribute to the production of brand value, and how is it harnessed to 
produce neoliberal socioeconomic arrangements? 
 
Nick Couldry: 
We have an interesting tension emerging here between the need to respect the emic aspects of what 
might be exploitation in the realm of digital labor and the fact that large-scale exploitation doesn’t tend to 
come with a “how to deconstruct me” pack attached. A lot of work needs to be done to develop a 
metalanguage that includes terms through which complex practices might be validly seen as exploitation. 
This is particularly so where the site of power in question involves the concentration of symbolic 
resources, since such power holders will certainly have developed their own positive and influential 
narrative about what is going on that does not use the word exploitation. 
 
If this last point is agreed, then maybe we should see if we can try to develop such a metalanguage in this 
conversation. My first stab along these lines, inspired by Alison’s comments in particular, is that digital 
conditions of labor, whatever their other positive aspects, facilitate strategies that pass onto laborers the 
possibility/obligation to produce not only the human preconditions (as Marx expected) but also the direct 
means of their labor: the website, the platform, the network, the blog, the constant acts of digital 
monitoring, reskilling, and so on. A frequent spin on this from power holders is that this amounts to a 
condition of freedom, and it may often be felt this way, too; but, as many of you make clear in your work, 
this is far from simply being the case. We’re back again to Beck’s (1992) phrase about individuals being 
forced to “find biographical solutions to systemic contradictions.” 
 
The push toward big data harvesting, however, generalizes this tension to all who, through their 
interactions online, generate data of value to large-scale capital. They/we generate abstract data value 
through the interactions we perform, but, in the process of doing so, we use (exploit?) ourselves/our 
partners in all our/their bodily specificity. 
 
John Edward Campbell: 
 
I would like to return to Nick’s original provocation. Nick asked if we are in the midst of rethinking what 
constitutes labor as opposed to free creative activity. For me, the distinction between labor and such 
creative activities is artificial and unproductive. I suspect the impetus to see various online creative 
activities as something other than labor stems from the conflation of labor and exploitation. However, if 
we return to a fundamental Marxist understanding, labor in and of itself need not be exploitative. Rather, 
labor is simply the process by which humans transform the world around them. In the process of 
transformation, something meaningful—something of value—to humans is created. This value need not be 
economic, but rather could be purely aesthetic, functional, or pleasurable. Thus, when Henry David 
Thoreau ventured into the woods near Walden Pond and constructed for himself a cabin in which to live, 
he was performing labor in the strict Marxist sense. Importantly, Marx points out that in this process, the 
person performing the labor is also transformed. As Marx articulates in Capital (1976), it is through the 
performance of labor that we come to realize our own potential. 
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Furthermore, in Grundrisse (1973), Marx sees labor as a process of discovery; through labor individuals 
discover aspects of themselves (talents, ambitions, needs, desires) of which they were previously 
unaware. They grow not only in regard to their skills and abilities, but also in terms of their self-
conceptions. In my recent work with Disney fans who produced unofficial Disney content on various social 
media platforms, it is through the time and effort they invest in their creations that they discover new 
talents and passions. To fail to see these activities as a form of labor is to downplay the considerable 
effort that goes into producing these creative products. 
 
So how, then, does exploitation enter into the equation? Mark already alluded to Erin Olin Wright and the 
notion that exploitation occurs when there is coercion to perform various forms of labor that benefit other 
classes at the expense of the laborer. The problem Mark rightly identifies is that such exploitation is easily 
recognized under traditional industrial relations but is far less clear under the conditions of information 
capitalism, where so many forms of labor appear voluntary. This is complicated by the fact that some 
online activities carry with them their own intrinsic rewards, such as a sense of community or creative 
expression. Tiziana Terranova (2000) has noted how some of these forms of free labor can be both 
pleasurable and exploitative, and Hector Postigo (2009) uses the term “passionate labor” to identify 
certain online practices that provide sufficient emotional returns that they aren’t even recognized as work 
by those performing them. 
 
For these reasons, I find it useful to distinguish between oppressive forms of exploitation and more 
abstract forms of exploitation made possible by information technologies. As David Hesmondhalgh (2010) 
has argued, it’s problematic to suggest the person sitting at a computer making posts on Facebook or 
uploading videos to YouTube is exploited in the same sense as those working in Indonesian sweatshops. 
Oppressive forms of exploitation are readily apparent to the worker and have a direct and obvious impact 
on the material existence of the laborer, whether in the sweatshops in Bangladesh, the Foxconn plants in 
China, or among workers at Walmart in the United States who are not paid a livable wage. 
 
However, in abstract modes of exploitation, the worker may remain unaware of the wealth his or her 
activities generate for a small class of people. This would be the case with what I identify as the “labor of 
devotion”—a form of work found in brand communities (Campbell, 2011). Furthermore, the worker does 
not necessarily see any material impact on his or her existence as a result of the labor. Certainly with 
Kuehn and Corrigan’s notion of “hope labor” (as mentioned by Adam) or Brooke Duffy’s concept of 
“aspirational labor” (Marwick & Duffy, 2013), the worker may see such free labor as potentially improving 
the material conditions under which he or she lives. All this requires a rethinking of what exploitation 
means under the conditions of information capitalism. 
 
Finally, in opening this discussion, Nick asked whether unrewarded labor is ever a good thing. If by 
unrewarded we mean not financially compensated, then the answer is most assuredly yes. Many forms of 
volunteer and activist work receive no financial compensation, yet the rewards of such labor are found in 
the very efforts to improve the material conditions of humanity. The distinction between volunteer and 
activist work and what Terranova identifies as free labor is that volunteers and activists are aware of who 
(at least abstractly) benefits from their efforts. In contrast, the free laborer is not necessarily aware of 
who is profiting from his or her efforts and thus enters into the arrangement (potentially) uninformed. 
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Such asymmetries of knowledge are arguably a central feature of those abstract modes of exploitation 
found under the conditions of information capitalism. 
Mark Andrejevic: 
 
Rereading the posts so far, I’m struck by the general level of agreement and by the very useful 
qualifications, provocations, and formulations that have emerged around the theme of labor and the 
question of exploitation. This is, I realize, at least in part a function of the commitments shared by the 
group that Nick has assembled. The comments have also exhibited broad shifts in theoretical focal length: 
from close-ups of particular case studies to big-picture questions about ownership and control of the 
communicative infrastructure, the role of gender in the configuration of various forms of interactivity, and 
the compatibility of democratic values with capitalist imperatives. It seems important, and perhaps a 
defining challenge, to attempt to think those various levels together. Such an attempt would likely end up 
having to step back farther to consider the larger context in which digital labor, however one might 
construe the term, is embedded. In other words, we would find ourselves asking questions about how the 
various examples cited so far fit within broader logics of global capitalism. Answering questions about the 
digital surely entails avoiding the temptation of placing it at the center of the analysis in ways that eclipse 
the economic and social systems in which its deployment is embedded. 
I was recently revisiting some of the debates around the provocations in Hindman’s The Myth of Digital 
Democracy (2008) and was struck by a familiar pattern: the use of compelling anecdotes to counter 
overarching general claims (about the myth of media democratization). We are by now past the moment 
of as-yet-unfulfilled potential when the anecdotal might claim to hold sway. We can now ask some pointed 
empirical questions about how forms of systemic, structural inequality (economic, geographic, gender, and 
more) are faring in the wake of the deployment of digital communication technologies and strategies. We 
might give different answers in different political, social, and regional contexts, but we would be hard 
pressed, I think, to insulate the media from their societal contexts—to say, for example, that the forms of 
increasing economic inequality and centralized forms of political control in the United States are unrelated 
to digital transformations. Whatever benefits one attributes to these transformations—and I wouldn’t want 
to discount these—they emerge against the background of a somewhat more ominous horizon and reflect 
its shadows. 
To borrow John Campbell’s terms, I think it’s worth asking how and when what he calls “abstract 
exploitation” becomes concrete. I like the formulation not so much because I think that the forms of 
exploitation to which it refers can only be considered as such in nonconcrete terms, but because of the 
implication that work needs to be done to reattach them to the social relations and consequences from 
which they have been abstracted. 
Adam Fish: 
 
As John Campbell noted, we need to consider the political potential of transformational digital labor. Is the 
production of radical infrastructures possible, and, if so, what role can theory have in their production? 
Any digital democracy, as Mark notes, depends not upon anecdotes of empowered citizen-journalists but 
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on the development of critical media theory and autonomous global information infrastructures. Globally 
distributed and pan-nationally governed information infrastructures on which our social, political, and 
economic lives increasingly depend are prohibitively expensive to produce. But for a moment let’s 
improbably ponder what role digital laborers and their competencies may have in producing 
antihegemonic information infrastructures. Alison reminds us that in its self-valorization, digital capitalism 
appropriates a mundane politics—the mitigation of alienation—and thereby distracts us from the 
revolutionary politics of social emancipation. Can we as scholars refocus from the banalities of free labor 
to the radical project of emancipatory labor? 
 
On digital laborers with coding, hacking, cryptographic, and network administration skills, the hope for 
radical infrastructure resides. These “recursive publics” of computer geeks, as Chris Kelty (2008) calls 
them, with the agencies to transform their means of production—operating systems, open-source 
software, and network configurations—carry a political potential beyond their classical Western liberalism 
so accurately depicted by Gabriella Coleman (2012). Our research may facilitate the development of this 
political consciousness. Henry Jenkins (2014), for instance, uses corporate speaking invitations to lend 
“support to the more progressive voices within these organizations” (p. 279). How can our pedagogy and 
scholarship “nudge,” to use Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s irritating term (2008), these geeks not 
toward the production of hegemonic, or even counterhegemonic systems that valorize a contradictory 
capitalist democracy but toward imagining revolutionary information infrastructures? This would entail a 
shift of focus from merely counterhegemonic information infrastructure (open-source software, 3-D 
printing, ICT4D, etc.) to something more in the tradition of WikiLeaks, the Silk Road, Tor, and the 
International Modern Media Institute. Complicities with hegemonic capitalist democracy and dependencies 
on the privatized global Internet exist in each of these examples, but they are employers of digital 
workers in more or less antihegemonic work. Like historical analyses of worker’s lives, such hybrid spaces 
of media activism/labor complicate any theoretical fidelity to either cultural studies or political economy. 
Capitalist/democracy and labor/activism—these are the conflated contradictions at the crux of our problem 
that require robust field, historiographical, and critical discursive methodologies to explore. With these 
methodologies we may discover that antihegemonic information infrastructures—not unlike reified 
concepts such as digital democracy and free labor—exist in discursively vibrant but constructivist states of 
embodiment—good to think with but impossible to identify in indigenous practices. 
 
I think Alison has an excellent idea that perhaps we should join Intel and Microsoft to perform a type of 
knowledge exchange with digital workers. They can provide us ethnographic encounters while we engage 
them in political reflection. Once access is given, can our theories be mobilized to politicize a generation of 
coders before they become digital workers? This is certainly the type of collaborative yet critical media 
studies I would like to see more of in the future. 
 
Alison Hearn: 
 
I wish that Intel and Microsoft would allow us to set up the kinds of research projects Adam describes! I 
was being sardonic when I made the suggestion about joining Microsoft and Intel. The reality is that these 
companies are already cherry-picking high-performing scholars and recruiting them to become engineers. 
(Melissa Gregg gave a really sensitive and illuminating talk about hacktivism and her recent move to Intel 
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at the Apps and Affect conference we held here in [the other] London in Canada this past fall. See 
http://appsandaffect.blogspot.ca.) These scholars have access to huge amounts of data and tech support, 
great resources, and lots of freedom to design their research. But there are only a few of them, and we 
cannot be sure how much reactivity there might be between having such a lucrative and well-resourced 
corporate research job and the kinds of research that gets produced. My limited experience as a 
university-based independent scholar is that places like Microsoft and Intel will not disclose much at all 
when approached for site visits or interviews, or else they make you sign a nondisclosure agreement. But 
this does not mean we shouldn’t try what Adam suggests, and I would definitely be on board to do so. 
 
I admit that I am dubious about Adam’s other suggestion that we try nudging coders and hackers to a 
counterhegemonic sensibility before they become digital laborers. My sense is that many of these people, 
as we’ve already noted, occupy a liminal space between a vague political libertarianism (anonymous-
esque) and a desire to hit it big as professional game or app designers, or well-paid coders—the new 
dream jobs du jour of the digital labor market. The creation of a counterhegemonic information 
infrastructure has been tried. Design per se is not the issue; it’s the velocity of the flow, capture, and 
containment of these efforts by global virtual finance capital that should be our focus. In my old-fashioned 
Marxist opinion, it is only through a recognition of their alienation and exploitation as workers that we 
might come to see people push for shifts in the material conditions of work and then, potentially, in the 
products of that work (infrastructure design, for example) and its distribution. In the end, and at the risk 
of sounding clichéd and passé, although technologies and information infrastructures are important, they 
will not, on their own, make us freer or better. It is people, workers, who pay the price and people who 
will make change happen. 
Having said that, Greig de Peuter, Enda Brophy, and Nicole Cohen have done great research on the ways 
in which new precarious workers, freelancers, interns, and free workers are making attempts to organize 
around the globe; see http://culturalworkersorganize.org. They are also involved in a project tracing the 
labors of mobility, from the coltan miners in the Congo (who include child workers and are often employed 
by militia groups and violent drug cartels) and the precarious, exploited mobile phone assembly workers 
at places like Foxconn, where surplus value is coextensive with other forms of mobility—specifically 
migration—to the feminized, affective labor of call center workers; the outsourced, immaterial, highly 
masculinized labor of the app developer; and the precarious, deeply underpaid microworker or MTurker, a 
form of work growing by leaps and bounds in the developing world, because it can be done on the mobile 
phone (Brophy & de Peuter, in press). 
At the Apps and Affect conference, the term I heard deployed over and over again in almost every session 
I attended was tether. We are tethered to the network. We are tethered for work. We are tethered for 
play. We are tethered for social connection. We nurture and strengthen the tether to get rewards and the 
legitimation of high visibility. We are tethered to the networked general intellect, relying on immediate 
information without the validation of individual context or experience. In the face of the velocity of the 
“furies”—a metaphor Alex Galloway (2013) proposes for the contemporary distributed network, marked as 
it is by multiplicity, immanence, contagion, and an incontinence of form, with no space for interpretation, 
reflection or respite—we hold on very tight to our tether. To this, I say: Digital workers of the world, unite. 
You have nothing to lose but your tethers! 
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John Edward Campbell: 
 
Mark, while referencing Hindman’s The Myth of Digital Democracy, noted how the use of compelling 
anecdotes can sometimes function as distractions from broader patterns of oppression and inequality. I 
absolutely agree. That said, poignant anecdotes can expose the consequences for the individual of these 
overarching structures. For example, the story of Mary Margaret Vojtko, an adjunct teacher for Duquesne 
University for 25 years, who died homeless and without health care, can be used to bring attention to the 
growing inequalities and exploitation occurring within academic institutions that increasingly rely on 
precarious labor. The anecdote can remind us that structures and systems have very real material 
ramifications on the personal level. However, the question must always be: Is this the exception or the 
norm? 
  
I also want to take a moment to clarify my thinking about abstract forms of exploitation. By abstract 
exploitation, I refer to how people may be contributing to a system of inequalities without themselves 
being directly materially impacted. Once the individual’s life is in some way materially affected by the 
exploitation, it then becomes concrete or oppressive. Now, it’s very important to keep in mind that the 
individual may not be fully aware of the ways his or her life is materially impacted by various online 
activities. For instance, individuals may not realize that information is being collected about them by the 
various online sites they use, and this information may be employed in determining what types of material 
opportunities will be made available to them. I have in mind here studies of online surveillance, such as 
Mark’s work on YouTube and my work on PlanetOut (2005). 
None of this precludes what Adam identifies as emancipatory labor, but we need to look critically at the 
ways the architecture of these commercial sites (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, etc.) facilitate or hinder 
such emancipatory impulses. Perhaps we should explore alternative models of online sites—such as 
noncommercial sites that will be viewed as public goods rather than private property—that more 
effectively promote emancipatory endeavors. 
Laurie Ouellette: 
Nick began our conversation by asking us to consider whether (and how) changing forms of information 
production and circulation integral to contemporary digital media culture have impacted the division of 
labor. Implicitly, he also challenges us to pave some new ground in the increasingly stale dichotomy 
between those who celebrate new spaces of creative social and political potential and those who see ever 
more nefarious forms of labor exploitation. 
 
During our discussion, some concepts that structure this dichotomy (exploitation, value, even labor itself) 
have been opened and challenged in ways that I’ve found incredibly helpful. I’d like to push a bit further 
on the issue of subjectivity, and circle back to my earlier remarks on labor and gender. 
 
The relationship between labor and subjectivity has already been suggested in a number of interesting 
ways: as the question of self-exploitation in the absence of coercion (John Banks), as the transformative 
possibilities of digital or hope labor (Adam Fish), and as the contradictions of online value production—the 
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provocative tension between the imperative to self-brand and the extent to which data mining ultimately 
cares little about individuality. However, subjects—including workers—are not born but made. 
 
Likewise, as Kathi Weeks argues in The Problem With Work (2011), work is “not just an economic 
practice”; it is also fundamentally a process of subjectification to the norms of what she calls “The Work 
Society.” From this perspective, it seems useful to sidestep concerns about the degree of exploitation 
associated with the production of the digital cultural economy and consider more fully the mediating 
function of digital activity as one component of the social constitution of laborers in the 21st century. How 
do populations “learn to labor” in a global economy that values creativity, flexibility, precarity, and 
immateriality? What role does our changing digital media culture play? 
 
Here, scholarship on digital games as an informal training ground for immaterial labor in the West is 
especially helpful. Stephen Kline, Nick Dyer-Witheford, and Greig de Peuter (2003) have connected skills 
acquired through game play to the requirements of the post-Fordist workforce. Feminist scholars such as 
Valerie Walkerdine (2009) and Aubrey Anable have highlighted the gendered nature of this training. For 
example, Anable suggests that “casual games” like Farmville mediate the skills and rhythms of time 
management associated with femininity and “stages the affective work of being a woman worker (what it 
feels like) . . . during a time when affective and immaterial labor has become the model for most work 
regardless of gender” (2013, para. 6). This, she suggests, is why casual (and much-derided) women’s 
games are both useful to post-Fordist capitalism and deeply meaningful to the women subjects they help 
to create. 
 
My own work with Julie Wilson (2011) on digital media platforms promising to help women manage 
families and domestic lives similarly calls for an expanded definition of labor that acknowledges unwaged 
women’s work. Following political theorists such as Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, and Wendy Brown, we 
argue that unpaid affective and familial labor is generative of neoliberal sociality. A growing swath of 
digital media culture aimed at women literally extends the labor (and anxieties) associated with the care 
of families across changing configurations of mediated time and space. This second shift connects the 
pleasures and freedoms of interactive media to a dispersed mode of biopolitical production that isn’t 
valorized as creative and doesn’t count as exploitation in the traditional Marxist sense. Our research brings 
gender into Beck’s formulation of finding autobiographical solutions to structural inequalities, noted by 
Nick. More to the point of this forum, it raises other questions we might ask about the sexual division of 
labor and the politics of gender and leisure in the digital media age. 
 
■ ■ ■ 
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